History Scotland Magazine: Sensationalism and Secrecy: The Aberdeen Typhoid Outbreak, 1964

The Queen meeting local dignitaries, June 28 1964. (Aberdeen Journal)

Sensationalism and Secrecy:
The Aberdeen Typhoid Outbreak, 1964

Lesley Diack and David Smith

One of the hit records in Britain during the summer of 1964 was On the Beach by Cliff Richard and the Shadows. The lyrics extol the virtues of meeting and partying on the beach. This was not something that was to happen with any regularity on Aberdeen beach in 1964. Not, as you might suppose, because of the weather, but because of one of the most significant food poisoning incidents of the twentieth century. Aberdeen in early summer 1964, was in the grip of a typhoid epidemic that was eventually to hospitalise over five hundred people and to virtually imprison the rest of the population in an unofficial cordon sanitaire. All this happened at a time when it was thought that large typhoid epidemics had been relegated to history or were only likely to strike underdeveloped countries. In these circumstances, the Aberdeen outbreak highlighted the continuing potential for serious food poisoning episodes within modern food systems. It was the first such outbreak to attract intense media interest.

Argentinian corned beef suspected

In August 1963 a new supermarket opened in Aberdeens west-end. It was very modern in design and layout, part of a new trend away from traditional small shops to larger self-service supermarkets. This supermarket was one of seven opened during 1963 by a Dundee-based chain, William Low & Co., who since the late 1950s had been very forward-looking in adapting and expanding their existing branch network. By May 1964 the shop had established a regular clientele and was becoming a successful branch. Disaster struck sometime between 7 and 9 May when a six lb can of Argentinian corned beef was opened and was sold sliced from the cold meat counter over the next few days. Later it was discovered that the can had been cooled during processing in untreated river water and the typhoid organism was presumed to have entered through a small hole in the seam. Although there had been no specific typhoid outbreak near the factory, it has been estimated that sixty-six tons of excrement and 250,000 gallons of urine entered the river every day. This state of sanitary hygiene was ideal for the spread of the typhoid bacillus, especially in a country that recorded over 10,000 cases of typhoid per year in the early 1960s.

The usual incubation period for typhoid is ten to fourteen days but in Aberdeen the first victim visited her doctor after only five days, to be formally diagnosed with typhoid a week later. This patient was initially admitted to hospital with pyrexia [fever] of unknown origin, but by 20 May fifteen people were in isolation at the City Hospital, and the laboratory had identified their condition as typhoid. Following careful detective work by local public health doctors, health visitors, laboratory staff, and the Public Health Laboratory Service in Colindale, by 23 May imported corned beef was identified as the likely source of the outbreak. By 2 June more than fifty people a day were being admitted with suspected typhoid. One question that is often asked is how can over five hundred people be affected by the contents of one can of corned beef? Frequently the reply was that only in Aberdeen could this happen, alluding to the thrifty image of its citizens. The correct explanation, however, is that the modern meat slicing machine transferred the infection onto other meats and the counters nearby. One vegetarian patient had never eaten corned beef or any other sort of meat from the shop, but had bought some apples. William Low & Co. was never to be successful again in Aberdeen and the supermarket closed a few years later.

As the number of patients grew, finding beds for them became a priority for the local health staff. Routine operations were cancelled and the hospitals directed their efforts towards coping with the emergency. Both the City and Tor-na-Dee hospitals temporarily became typhoid hospitals and some wards were cleared to admit typhoid patients at the Royal Aberdeen Childrens and Woodend Hospitals. Many of the patients were in hospital for six weeks and some for as long as three months. Patients generally felt well after a few days but were kept in the wards because of the risk of the infection spreading. To this end they were not discharged until three consecutive faecal samples tested clear of the typhoid organism, the last patient leaving hospital on 8 September. Nevertheless, the critical phase of the outbreak was over in just a month and the all clear was declared on 17 June, signalling the beginning of the return to normal life in the city. At the end of the month the queen made a morale-boosting visit to the city to thank all those who had helped control the outbreak and to signal that Aberdeen was safe for visitors. Over 40,000 people lined the streets to welcome Her Majesty.

In the north east of Scotland, memories of the outbreak are vivid because of the effect on the life of all who lived in the city whether they knew someone with typhoid or not. The cancellation of social events, the closure of schools, restrictions on travel, and damage to the local tourist industry affected many people. And to this day local newspapers regularly remind readers of the affair. For example, the Evening Express on 27 March 2001 used the headline BLACKEST DAYS FOR TOURISM SINCE TYPHOID to introduce an article discussing the impact of the recent foot-and-mouth outbreak. But local memories were also shaped by the extensive coverage of the outbreak at the time in the press and on the television and radio. The character of the press coverage was determined partly by the large number of people affected, the association of the sickness with a popular item of diet, and the human interest angles. A key element, however, was the press strategy of Aberdeens medical officer of health, Dr Ian MacQueen.

Dr Ian MacQueen and the media

Ian MacQueen, who had been appointed to his post as head of Aberdeens Health and Welfare Department in 1952, saw the outbreak as an opportunity as well as challenge. He had initially taken an MA in English at Edinburgh University, and wrote for The Student newspaper, intending a career in journalism. On graduation in the early 1930s, however, finding career prospects in journalism poor, he embarked on a medical degree. After a number of other public health posts in both England and Scotland, MacQueen moved to Aberdeen still retaining a strong interest in the press. In the 1950s he began using the printed media in the Health and Welfare Departments innovative health education activities, and by the early 1960s showed a keen interest in the potential of television.

The Aberdeen typhoid outbreak allowed MacQueen to experiment by using the media as an instrument of outbreak controlas a way of educating the public to use strict personal hygiene and to avoid any behaviour that might involve a risk of catching or spreading the disease. He therefore held daily, and at times twice daily, press conferences, appearing every night on the television with the latest advice to the citizens of Aberdeen and reports of the numbers of people with typhoid. MacQueen rapidly became a media personality and his television appearances were watched with avid interest.

MacQueen later insisted that one of the functions of the press conferences had been to allay fears and calm the population. However, journalists who were present suggest that MacQueen unwittingly became the source of some of the alarmist headlines that appeared during the outbreak. According to one informant, the most famous of all the headlines, NOW A BELEAGUERED CITY, a quote attributed to MacQueen that appeared in the newspapers on 30 May, was actually a phrase used by a journalist and fed to MacQueen in the form of a question. However, as news of the outbreak spread around the world, reports became even more exaggerated and sensational. Anxious relatives of Aberdonians began to phone from the United States and elsewhere to say they had heard that there were so many bodies that they had been left lying on the beach waiting to be buried! Others enquired whether they should send food parcels.

Aberdeens tourist industry was also badly damaged by the adverse publicity. It has been estimated that over 25,000 visitors cancelled their holidays to the city and losses amounted to 7-10 million. Aberdonians also found their own holidays cancelled and people with Aberdeen accents who ventured from the north east often found themselves ostracised. An extreme example of some of the bizarre situations that occurred is provided by the treatment of an American couple of Scottish origin who were visiting Scotland for the first time in thirty years. Finding that they could not get a hotel room in Greenock because the wife retained a strong Aberdeen accent, they event-ually had to settle for a cell in the local jail. There are also examples of fear of typhoid disrupting the plans of Scottish people who were not even from Aberdeen. On 14 June, below a front-page headlineBARRED BECAUSE THEYRE FROM SCOTLANDthe Sunday Mail recounted the plight of a group of Scottish students who had arranged summer jobs with Birds Eye in Grimsby but were then banned as holiday workers.

MacQueen could hardly be blamed for these examples of exaggerated press reports and irrational fears of contact with Aberdonians and other Scots. Nevertheless, the official committee of enquiry into the outbreak, the Milne Committee, which reported in December 1964, explicitly blamed MacQueen for creating the impression of a national disaster and transforming the outbreak into a press sensation. The committee suggested that rather than giving press conferences, issuing one press release per day would have been sufficient. Government officials took great delight in this criticism of MacQueen.

Whitehall secrecy

The findings of the Milne Committee were a source of satisfaction for government officials because the comments about MacQueen diverted attention for their own failings. In comparison with the criticisms of MacQueen, the criticisms of the government departments were slight and muted. This was perhaps surprising considering that the Aberdeen outbreak was the fourth incident attributed to Argentinian corned beef during the previous twelve months, the three earlier outbreaks involving a total of seventy-two victims. The committee accepted the officials explanation that their powers to compel the withdrawal of suspect stocks had been inadequate to prevent the 1964 outbreak. However, had the Committee made a sufficiently detailed and critical examination of the files of the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF), they may have come to different conclusions. Rather than placing so much emphasis upon MacQueens extravagant use of the media, they may have concluded that the Aberdeen outbreak could have been avoided had the government officials been less fearful of publicity and more proactive after the three 1963 outbreaks.

The first outbreak occurred in Harlow in May/June 1963 and Argentinian corned beef soon came under suspicion. It was reported that untreated cooling water was used in the canning process and a typhoid outbreak had occurred nearby around the time of production of the suspect can. However, the Ministry of Health advised that there was insufficient evidence to justify action against other stock from the same plant currently in circulation. There were two further typhoid outbreaks linked with canned corned beef from the same canning factory associated with the Harlow outbreak before the Ministry of Health ruled that the evidence was strong enough to request the recall of suspect stock. The second outbreak in South Shields occurred in June/July while the third was in Bedford in October/November. In early November the distributors of the corned beef were called to a meeting at the Ministry of Health. While they challenged the evidence linking the typhoid outbreaks with their corned beef, they agreed to comply with the ministrys request. Ministry officials reassured the company representatives that publicity would be kept to a minimum: this was why the company had been asked to handle the recall. The alternative was to notify 1,500 medical officers of health about the situation, naming the brand concerned. If press enquiries were received the officials agreed to avoid naming the company and, if possible, the country of origin of the corned beef. The success of this strategy is shown by the fact that the number of mentions of the typhoid outbreaks in The Times, decreased from Harlow to Bedford, amounting to only five in the latter case (compared to 120 in the case of Aberdeen). And National Food Survey data suggests that the outbreaks had little or no effect on corned beef consumption in Britain during 1963.

Following the Bedford outbreak it was eventually agreed to send MAFFs chief technical adviser on meat inspection to South America to check the hygiene at meat plants. Arriving in Argentina in mid-January 1964, he soon reported that he had discovered another canning factory using untreated river water for cooling. Five shipments of corned beef from the factory were en route to the UK, but by the time this news reached London, two had arrived, and were already in the distribution chain. Three others were placed in a bond pending the return of the MAFF inspector. It was then agreed with the company concerned that the three shipments in bond would be re-exported, but that stock already in circulation need not be recalled. At the companys request this was left as a gentlemens agreement and publicity was again avoided. About a month later the Aberdeen typhoid outbreak began, and was later found to be associated with the suspect stock that officials had decided not to withdraw.

Lessons learnt?

After the Aberdeen typhoid outbreak and the report of the Milne Committee, there were some signs of change to the MAFF and Ministry of Health strategies but in general they sought to continue, as far as possible, making decisions along traditional civil service lines: in secret. Fortunately, for a time, there were no further large and serious food poisoning outbreaks but in the 1980s and 1990s came the salmonella in eggs, listeria in cheese, e. coli 0157 in meat and BSE/new variant CJD affairs. Just as it took three typhoid outbreaks in 1963 before any action was taken against the source of infection, it took this succession of food poisoning episodes, during which allegations of government cover-ups became central to media stories, to force a change in the broader climate of policy making. When the long-running and exhaustive BSE inquiry finally reported at the end of October 2000, it was greeted in The Times with the headline BSE INQUIRY ATTACKS CULTURE OF SECRECY AND COMPLANCY. But by this time the Food Standards Agency (FSA) had been operating for seven months, established in an attempt to restore public confidence in British food safety, and food policy was being subjected to open public scrutiny as never before. The FSA has developed a sophisticated press and public relations strategy involving a system of advisory committees, a comprehensive web-site giving access to numerous policy papers, and frequent press briefings.

Today, a solution to the major problem thrown up by the Milne report, that of how to convey the necessary information to the public during a food poisoning episode without encouraging sensationalism and irresponsible journalism, may prove elusive. In view of the events of the last fifteen years or so, the media are now very well practised in critical reporting of food safety incidents. The need to prepare effective arrangements for handling the media during outbreaks was an issue that was raised by the enquiry into the e. coli 0157 outbreak in South Lanarkshire in 1996. The FSA might now be expected to provide a lead in this area, but their communications officer admitted at a meeting of the Scottish Food Advisory Committee in May 2001 that a communications strategy in the event of a food safety emergency has still to be finalised. Despite such weaknesses, the new visibility of food policy-making that has come about through the establishment of the FSA may represent significant progress. It is to be hoped that greater openness in food safety issues will in future place pressure on food manufacturers and civil servants which will reduce the likelihood of the kind of scenario that allowed the Aberdeen typhoid outbreak to happen after the warnings of 1963. Future historians will be able to judge whether a decisive and effective change in food safety has taken place.

Lesley Diack and David Smith lecture in history at the University of Aberdeen and are working on a three-year project on the history of the Aberdeen typhoid outbreak, along with Professors Hugh Pennington and Elizabeth Russell of the medical faculty, with funding from the Wellcome Trust, whose support is gratefully acknowledged.